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Daubert is one of the more important decisions of the twentieth 
century because it changed fundamentally the relationship between 
law and science.1  Prior to Daubert, the law deferred to the scientific 
community on the question whether answers that scientists provide 
are sufficiently grounded in theory and practice to be trusted and 
acted upon by courts.  After Daubert, judges are charged 
independently to appraise what science has to offer, in effect 
screening out evidence offered as science if it is invalid or unreliable. 
To put it another way, a pre-Daubert judge who might have 
hesitated to exclude what seemed to be testimony on a matter of 
science could say, in effect, “it is not the court who rejects what you 
say, but other experts in your field.”  A judge fearful of criticism for 
admitting such testimony could say, in effect, “it is not the court who 
endorses what this expert has to say, but credentialed people in a 
recognized discipline.”  A post-Daubert judge has less room to hide.  If 
he excludes evidence proffered as science he is expected to say “the 
court finds that what you say is not sufficiently grounded in theory or 
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 1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (noting that FRE 702 
superseded the Frye standard; under FRE 702, scientific evidence must be valid in the 
sense of being reliable and must “fit” the case and, even if  the evidence does satisfy 
these requirements, it is subject to the possibility of exclusion under FRE 403) (citing 
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (adopting what has come to 
be known as the “general acceptance” standard)). 
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practice,” or “lacks sufficient basis in fact” or “lacks sufficient 
connection to the case at hand.”  A post-Daubert judge who admits 
such evidence is expected to say “the court finds that indeed this 
testimony is properly grounded in theory and practice, and 
adequately based on the facts and sufficiently related to the task at 
hand.”  To be sure, Daubert still leaves room to hide.  Factors like 
“peer review”2 and “general acceptance” provide opportunities, as 
does the possibility of invoking FRE 403, and a judge can also 
distance himself by casting his decision in terms of “adequate 
assurances” or “inadequate assurances” of validity.3 
The basic point, however, is that Daubert puts judges into the 
position of judging science.  That makes Daubert revolutionary.4 
Criticisms of Daubert abound, particularly in toxic tort cases.  
Perhaps such criticisms are inevitable when a single case so 
profoundly changes the legal landscape.  The most serious criticisms 
are advanced from three perspectives: One is epistemological and 
structural (or “political” in the fine sense of the term).  This criticism 
holds that judges are not much more able than juries to appraise 
proof offered as science, and that attempts to exercise the 
“gatekeeping” role infringe on the powers and responsibilities of 
juries to act as factfinders.  Another criticism is pragmatic, 
substantive, and to some extent ideological.  This criticism holds that 
judges applying Daubert are throwing out too much good evidence 
proffered by civil claimants in toxic tort cases.  A third is 
philosophical.  This criticism holds that Daubert misunderstands 
science. 
What follows is a defense of Daubert against these criticisms, 
followed by a suggestion of my own, which is that the Daubert 
revolution would achieve more if appellate courts abandoned the 
 
 2 For an argument that “peer review” is not what it is cracked up to be, see Joelle 
Anne Moreno, Eyes Wide Shut: Hidden Problems and Future Consequences of the Fact-Based 
Reliability Standard, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. __ (upcoming in Fall 2003). 
 3 See generally Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining 
“Reliable” Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 317 (2001) (arguing that 
judges should not determine “whether the explanative theory actually works” to 
produce an accurate conclusion, but “whether there are sufficient assurances” that it 
does). 
 4 One crude measure of Daubert’s impact can be seen just by glancing at citation 
history.  In the 38 years between 1945 and the decision in Daubert in 1993, Frye was 
cited in approximately 260 reported federal cases and 800 reported state cases.  As of 
this writing, Daubert is almost ten years old.  As of January 25, 2003, Daubert has been 
cited in nearly 2,500 reported federal cases and 1,200 reported state cases, while Frye 
has been cited in approximately 270 reported federal cases and 1,000 reported state 
cases. 
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abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing the rulings of trial judges in 
this area.  To be fair, I should note that most critics have not called 
for the abandonment of Daubert and few would endorse a return to 
the Frye standard.  Casting the criticisms in their best light, their aim 
is to improve Daubert, an undertaking that I gladly join.  This essay 
addresses civil rather than criminal cases,5 and scientific evidence 
rather than “experiential expertise,” even though this dichotomy is 
hard to draw and counts for less than it once did because the Daubert 
standard applies to all expertise.6 
I.  JUDGES CAN DO BETTER THAN JURIES: DAUBERT GATEKEEPING MADE 
REAL 
In a nutshell, Daubert is the right standard because it asks directly 
the question that Frye put only indirectly, and thus puts courts in a 
better position to arrive at satisfactory answers.  The central issue is 
scientific “validity,” and the criteria suggested by Daubert are useful in 
resolving that issue. 
Here it is worth pausing to ask some pragmatic questions: Why 
have a validity standard to begin with?  Why not simply approach 
science with the kind of openness suggested by FRE 702 on its face?  
In other words, why not simply admit scientific evidence if it seems 
relevant and helpful and the witness is qualified? 
The answer given by the Court is more positivist than policy-
based.  FRE 702 requires science to satisfy a validity standard, so courts 
are bound to scrutinize such proof.  That answer is unsatisfactory 
because it does not emerge from the “plain meaning” of FRE 702 or 
even a reasonable interpretation of the Rule’s language.  The Court 
has acknowledged that the Rules did not displace all prior evidence 
 
 5 I’ve heard enough from able commentators, including Professor Risinger, to 
be convinced that courts are too credulous with purported scientific evidence in 
criminal cases.  Daubert seems to have exposed the soft underbelly of forensic science, 
and I think that judges, to the extent they see the problem, are troubled more by the 
prospect that the system will break down than by the prospect that unreliable 
evidence is being used to convict.  There is such a thing as too much revolution, and 
the impact of Daubert in criminal cases has yet to be worked out in a satisfactory way. 
 6 See Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (“Daubert’s general 
holding . . . applies not only to testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to 
testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ knowledge” under FRE 702).  
For an effort to develop standards, consistent with Kumho and Daubert, by which the 
validity of nonscientific expertise might be appraised, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, 
The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the 
Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2293 (1994) 
(stating that a trial judge can exclude experiential nonscientific expertise when it is 
based on no experience or only limited experience, and when the experience is too 
dissimilar from the issues at hand). 
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doctrine, and this point is critical to another major holding.7  The 
conclusion in Daubert rests on the notion that the word “scientific” as 
used in FRE 702 is a rich or deep normative term that implies a 
standard of legitimacy.  It is of course astonishing, if we suppose that 
this meaning really is to be found in FRE 702, that nothing in 
legislative background supports this reading (in fact the term seems 
merely descriptive).  In truth, the Rules provide no compelling basis 
for discarding the old Frye standard.  What we now call the Daubert 
standard is in reality judge-made law disguised as something else.  
That is not to say that I disapprove of the decision, for the opposite is 
true: I think Daubert represents an advance, that it is at least 
consistent with the elastic contours of FRE 702, and that it good 
lawmaking, even if disingenuous in its logic.8 
But there are questions that should be asked before reaching 
that conclusion: Should we have such a standard?  Does it make the 
law better?  Keeping the focus on civil cases, my answer is yes. 
I think that three facts of modern life conspire to suggest that we 
need a validity standard: First, we ask courts to resolve difficult 
technical and scientific issues.  Second, much scientific knowledge is 
fluid and contestable, inaccessible to laypeople, hard to understand, 
and qualified in ways that elude ordinary experience and intuitions.  
Third, our adversary system places primary responsibility for 
gathering and presenting evidence in the hands of the parties, and 
creates incentives that lead to risks. 
What we see is something like this: Complex questions arise, 
which can be answered, if at all, only by calling on scientific expertise.  
A salient modern example is the question of causation in the toxic 
tort setting.  Parties and courts look to science for the answer.  
Lawyers on each side find experts who agree to help for a price.  The 
issue is joined, and we discover that there is no definitive answer and 
only partial information—studies and theories, usually involving 
 
 7 See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (explaining that the drafters of 
the Rules could not have intended to “scuttle entirely” the practice of cross-
examining to show bias, even though they offer no “express treatment” of the 
subject); see also Edward Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 
NEB. L. REV. 908, 915 (1978) (stating that after adoption of the Rules, “no common 
law of evidence remains,” at least “in principle,” but “in reality” the situation is 
different, because “the body of common law knowledge continues to exist” in the 
“somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated 
powers”) (internal citations omitted). 
 8 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255 (1986) (contrasting, inter alia, 
law as pragmatism with law as integrity, meaning that judges seek to resolve hard 
cases by some “coherent set of principles” in order to make the “complex structure” 
of law and politics “the best these can be”). 
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some combination of chemical structure analysis, animal tests, 
epidemiology, and/or “differential diagnosis.”  None of the proof 
either does or can answer directly the question of individual causation 
(“specific” causation).  Instead, such proof shows a possibility, and 
perhaps sometimes a probability, of causation in an individual case by 
suggesting that the substance in question can or does cause some 
ailments in some people (“general” causation) or by suggesting that 
no other explanation is likely (differential diagnosis testimony). 
What can courts reasonably do?  Here is one possibility: Courts 
can suppose that the data and conclusions presented by qualified 
experts reflect valid science, upon which our system can reasonably 
allow a jury to rely in rendering a verdict for or against recovery in 
some very substantial amount.  That seems close to the view in 
jurisdictions that admit scientific evidence on the basis of a 
credentials test coupled with findings that the proof is relevant and 
helpful.9  But there is another possibility, which seems more realistic: 
We can make the judgment that not all evidence that is presented as 
science, even by qualified witnesses, is of such quality that it can be 
relied upon to make serious decisions of the sort required for civil 
judgments.  We can believe that such evidence varies in quality, and 
that sometimes it is not reliable enough.  We can suppose that gaps in 
scientific understanding create room for interpretive disagreement, 
and that financial incentives, whether arising from the involvement of 
scientists in commercial or other funded projects or from their 
involvement in litigation, can compromise expert testimony.  We can 
believe that science, like law, leaves room for principled intellectual 
disagreement that reflects differences in technical understanding or 
personal philosophy.  We can also suppose that these differences 
sometimes lead to errors or to conclusions that cannot be defended 
or would be condemned by most others of similar training.  
Obviously, Daubert reflects the latter view of science, and I think that 
is the more realistic view. 
There is yet another question.  Should we charge judges to be 
 
 9 See, e.g., State v. Peters, 534 N.W.2d 867, 871-73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (following 
neither Daubert nor Frye; in applying WRE 702, the trial judge is limited to 
considerations of relevancy, qualifications of the witness, whether the evidence is 
superfluous or will waste time or resources, whether probative value is outweighed by 
prejudice, whether jury can draw its own conclusions, whether the evidence is 
inherently improbable, and whether the area is suitable for expert opinion); Green 
v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 617 N.W.2d 881, 890 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (finding 
that unlike Daubert jurisdictions, where “the trial court has a significant ‘gatekeeper’ 
function in keeping from the jury expert testimony that is not reliable, the trial 
court’s gatekeeper role in [this state] is extremely limited”). 
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the gatekeepers, or should we fold the gatekeeping responsibility into 
the factfinding responsibility, leaving the assessment of science to 
juries?  As others have suggested, the right approach is to ask this 
question: Are judges more capable than juries of playing this role?  In 
his engaging contribution to this conversation, Professor Joseph 
Sanders says yes.10  His conclusion rests on an examination of 
empirical data (some published, some new and unpublished), and he 
is cautious.  Still, his conclusion is generally yes. 
Professor Sanders builds on what he calls a “counter-
revolutionary” Kansas decision and the work of Professor Alvin 
Goldman.11  Goldman suggests that we should consider (a) the 
characteristics of the audience (juries), (b) the characteristics of the 
witnesses (experts, including scientists), (c) the criterion to be 
applied (Daubert or some other standard), and (d) other alternatives.  
As for juries, we have indications that they have trouble with complex 
cases, and with scientific evidence, and we have reason to believe that 
better-educated juries do better in these areas.  We have indications 
that juries approach expertise with skepticism.  We have indications 
that juries appraise expert testimony not by grappling with technical 
issues, but by counting extraneous factors like qualifications, the 
number of arguments (rather than quality), and personal 
attractiveness.  We understand that jurors give more credence to 
messages framed in simple language, less to those framed in complex 
language, and they pay close attention to demeanor.  As for experts, 
we have confirmation of what we have long suspected: They tailor 
their testimony to please whoever pays them.  They learn to 
“perform” in court.  As for judges, we have some mixed news: Data on 
state judges suggest that many do not understand the “testability” 
concept (can the evidence be “falsified”?) or error rates, although 
 
 10 Joseph Sanders, The Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibiltiy of 
Expert Evidence, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 881, 937-38 (2003); see also Brian Leiter, The 
Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would not Make for Good 
Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 814-15 (1997) (referring to rules 
designed to substitute “the rulemaker’s judgment abut what is epistemically best for 
agents for their own judgment” as “epistemic paternalism”). 
 11 The Kansas decision is Kuhn v. Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1173-74 (Kan. 2000) 
(refusing to apply the state’s Frye standard to testimony by treating physician, based 
on differential diagnosis, that Parlodel caused a new mother to suffer stroke) 
(Parlodel is a drug taken by mothers, who prefer not to breast feed their babies, in 
order to suppress lactation).  The court’s reasoning in Kuhn involves consideration 
of factors similar to those advocated by Professor Goldman, except that the court 
here decides that those factors support the conclusion that juries can appropriately 
evaluate such testimony, so the judge need not play screening role.  The main work 
by Professor Goldman on which Professor Sanders draws is Alvin Goldman, Epistemic 
Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and Society, 88 J. of Philosophy 113 (1991). 
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they do better with criteria of peer review and general acceptance.  
Surveys of federal opinions, however, suggest that judges are 
achieving a better understanding of science.  As for alternatives, we 
have some indications that cross-examination does little to affect jury 
appraisals of expert testimony. 
Looking at this data, Professor Sanders concludes that they 
provide “some support” for restricting admissibility by a standard 
applied by judges.  He comments as well that his own reading of the 
cases indicates that courts are doing better than the survey of state 
judges suggests.  I agree, and I too can report that reading many 
decisions leads me to believe that appellate judges are doing better in 
appraising scientific proof than they did in the days of Frye. 
At the risk of being simplistic, I think four additional factors 
point toward the need for a validity standard in which trial judges 
screen out questionable science.  First, on balance judges are better 
educated than juries and are selected with attention to merit and 
skill.  Second, judges have experience with adversarial presentations 
and are likely to be better able to understand the substance of 
testimony and its relationship to the issues.  Both of these points 
suggest that judges can do better than juries in separating what 
should count from what should not.  Third, the complexity of 
scientific evidence suggests that the “relevancy” criterion that applies 
to other evidence is not adequate to deal with science.  Although I 
cannot prove it, I suspect that the very fact that a court admits 
evidence that is daunting or complex conveys to jurors an unspoken 
message of invitation, suggesting that they can rely on it (even though 
they need not).12  Finally, in jury-tried civil cases, it seems wiser to 
have judges decide the validity point simply because it is better to 
separate the decision on this point from the decision on the merits.  
The point is not merely that “two heads are better than one” 
(counting one head for the judge and one for the jury), but that one 
can reasonably expect a better decision on validity by someone who is 
not also responsible to decide whether the plaintiff or the defendant 
has the stronger case.13 
 
 12 That jurors’ expectations may affect the way they process the evidence they 
hear is recognized in a different context in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 
188-89 (1997) (stating that juror expectations may arise “from the experience of a 
trial itself,” and that shifting from descriptions by witnesses “naturally” describing “a 
train of events” to a different kind of presentation may make jurors “wonder what 
they are being kept from knowing”). 
 13 This point was raised during the Seton Hall Symposium, Expert Admissibility: 
Keeping Gates, Goals and Promises, in February 2003, but none of the various 
participants, whom I contacted, claims credit for it.  I had not thought of it before. 
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Finally, I think that juries are even less likely than judges to 
conclude that credentialed witnesses with scientific expertise are 
mistaken.  The eye-opening article in this Symposium by criminal 
defense lawyer James Shellow claims, on the basis of experience, that 
jurors cannot understand or follow cross-examination aimed at 
revealing “flaws in methodology,” and that effective cross requires 
essentially peripheral tactics, such as attacks on character or a 
demonstration that the expert’s opinion is contradicted by published 
texts.  The burden of the examples cited by Mr. Shellow is that the 
cross-examiner should exploit any unwillingness of the witness to 
acknowledge the authority of texts by casting that very fact as a 
demonstration of mendacity.14  This practitioner’s view supports 
empirical evidence described by Professor Sanders indicating that 
jurors do not effectively come to grips with scientific evidence. 
II.  DAUBERT DOES NOT THROW OUT TOO MUCH EVIDENCE 
Daubert has been cast as one of the villains in toxic tort claims 
that fail,15 but I doubt that this claim is correct, and doubt even more 
that this claim shows that Daubert is in some serious sense misguided 
or mistaken.  To start with, it was not clear on the day Daubert was 
decided whether the effect of the new doctrine was actually to raise 
or to lower the bar with respect to science (and now all expert 
testimony).  Although a recent study concludes that Daubert subjects 
evidence proffered as science to increased scrutiny, Daubert itself 
threw out a ruling that excluded expert testimony, and some modern 
state decisions continue to declare that Daubert favors admissibility 
more than Frye.16 
 
 14 James M. Shellow, The Limits of Cross-Examination, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. ___ 
(upcoming in Fall 2003). 
 15 See generally Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: 
The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 318 (2001) (pointing out that Daubert led to exclusion 
of epidemiological testimony, criticizing opinions requiring that such proof show a 
doubling of relative risk, and suggesting that federal courts should look to state 
requirements for proving causation); Lucinda Finley, Guarding the Gate to the 
Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort 
Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 375 (1999) (urging that courts should not 
place the burden of scientific uncertainty on plaintiffs). 
 16 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (contrasting the 
“liberal thrust” of the Rules and the “permissive backdrop” behind FRE 702 with the 
“austere standard” of Frye); State v. Leep, 569 S.E.2d 133, 143 (W. Va. 2002) 
(contrasting Frye with the “more liberal” Daubert standard and adopting the latter).  
But of course Judge Kozinski again excluded the evidence proffered in Daubert, this 
time applying the new standard.  See United States v. Daubert, 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 
1995); see also Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes In the Standards for Admitting Expert 
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A.  Critical Look Approach 
Properly understood, Daubert only asks courts to look critically at 
evidence proffered as science (or expertise more generally), and to 
determine whether it is valid and what it can prove.  In modern 
decisions Daubert does not automatically block efforts to prove 
causation by expert testimony resting, for example, on such 
techniques as animal studies17 or differential diagnosis.18  The former 
brings questions of dosage or exposure and questions stemming from 
differences between humans and animals.  The latter involves 
attempts by treating physicians to eliminate other causes until only 
one explanation is left.  Proof of this sort can survive scrutiny under 
Daubert, although it may properly be excluded if it fails adequately to 
fit the case, its factual basis is inadequate, or the methods or 
laboratory protocols were not properly followed.  The problems of 
rational inference raised by such evidence virtually invite attempts to 
prove cause by evidence that does not really do so, and one cannot 
seriously argue that all such proof is a reliable indicator of cause.  
There is room for difference of opinion in applying the Daubert 
standard, and no doubt room for mistakes.  But in areas of such 
difficulty, why would anyone expect otherwise? 
It is true that proof based on chemical structure analysis has had 
tough sledding, but skepticism is justified by the fact that the 
technique is not suited to this use, and serves better as a tool for 
mapping out future research.19  It is also true that cases applying 
 
Evidence In Federal Civil Cases since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 251, 
274 (2002) (commenting, inter alia, that standards for reliability “tightened in the 
years after the Daubert decision”). 
 17 Compare Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(reversing summary judgment for defendants, in so-called “slap suit,” because trial 
judge erred in refusing to consider Asian animal studies in support of 
manufacturer’s claim that diet supplement was safe; Daubert “recognized that animal 
studies are not per se inadmissible and should be subjected to substantive analysis, 
just like other scientific evidence”), and Curtis v M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 
669-70 (5th Cir. 1999) (partially reversing judgment dismissing claims arising out of 
exposure to benzene because testimony by plaintiff’s expert resting partly on animal 
studies satisfied Daubert standard), with Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 
1201 (11th Cir. 2002) (excluding testimony based on animal studies indicating that 
bromocriptine demonstrated vasoconstrictive properties in dogs and other animals 
because they did not suffice to indicate similar effects in humans). 
 18 See Mattis v. Carlon Elec. Prod., 295 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that 
testimony based on differential diagnosis can satisfy the Daubert standard). 
 19 See REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 203 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1994) 
(stating that the Environmental Protection Agency uses structure activity 
relationships [“SARs”] in predicting toxicity of new chemicals, but “[their] reliability 
has a number of limitations”) [hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL]; see also DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT 
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Daubert evince a preference for proving cause by means of 
epidemiological studies.20  The problem with too much enthusiasm 
for epidemiological evidence is that it is often unavailable: Claimants 
cannot come up with such proof because it is expensive and takes a 
long time to develop.  Even if such evidence constitutes “the gold 
standard” in this setting, however, courts applying Daubert regularly 
allow causation to be proved in other ways. 
B.  Daubert as Source of Bad Rules 
Some commentators suggest that Dabuert is the cause of certain 
“rules” that block recovery in toxic tort cases.  One is the supposed 
rule that epidemiological evidence is admissible only if it shows a 
doubling of incremental risk.  The problem is as follows: Suppose a 
study of two groups of 500 people, one group exposed to agent X and 
one not exposed.  In the exposed group, we find that thirty-six suffer 
ailment Y, but in the unexposed group only twenty people suffer 
ailment Y.  The usual standard of statistical significance, in which p = 
.05, requires that we be able to say that pure chance would produce 
the observed result only one time in twenty (p = .05 refers to that low 
probability).21  Under this standard, our result is significant.22  
 
TESTIMONY, Toxicology: The Use of Toxicology in the Safety Assessment of Chemicals, § 34-2.4 
(2002) (stating that “SAR has the pitfall of the exquisite sensitivity of certain 
biological processes to relatively minuscule changes in chemical structure”); David E. 
Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence after Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2178 (1994) (stating that 
“[c]hemical structure analysis is an example of a scientific technique that has valid 
scientific uses but is not properly used to prove causal association, much less 
individual causation”); Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1323 (Pa. 
Super Ct., 1997) (finding that epidemiological studies “are necessary to establish 
causation,” and that chemical structure analysis and in vitro testing can only “confirm 
the biological plausibility of a causal relationship” but “contribute nothing” on their 
own). 
 20 Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(considering “difficult question” whether evidence of causation “in the absence of 
epidemiology” can satisfy Daubert; here the answer is no; anecdotal evidence in the 
form of case reports, challenge/rechallenge data, chemical analogies, and animal 
studies are insufficient to prove that Parlodel causes strokes). 
 21 The calculations underlying the examples in this paragraph, and the text 
accompanying notes 68-71, infra, are the ones required in comparing the means of 
independent samples where standard deviation is not known (two groups of 500 
people, one exposed to agent X, the other not exposed).  The examples assume that 
prior research indicates a causal link between agent X and disease Y, which is 
important because the analysis must assume either that (1) it is unknown whether 
agent X might actually lessen the risk of disease Y or (2) it is known that agent X 
might increase the risk of disease Y and there is no reason to think it lessens that risk.  
In the latter situation, the analysis employs a one-tailed test, and more results survive 
scrutiny.  See RUSSELL T. HURLBURT, COMPREHENDING BEHAVIORAL STATISTICS, 238-74 
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Scientists would take it seriously as an indication that agent X causes 
ailment Y.23  Actually, it is now recommended that researchers 
reporting statistically significant findings include the “confidence 
interval” with their report.  The latter describes the range of outcomes 
that would be expected to occur by pure chance no more than five 
percent of the time.  The narrower the interval, and the further up 
from critical value that the interval lies, the higher the quality of the 
reported result.24 
Still, if all we knew about the plaintiff was that he was exposed to 
agent X and suffers ailment Y, even our statistically significant result 
does not by itself indicate that agent X probably caused plaintiff’s 
ailment.  We could say otherwise, however, if the result showed more 
than a doubling of incremental risk—let us say that 42 people in the 
exposed group suffer ailment Y, and only twenty people in the 
 
(3d ed. 2003) (providing an account of the underlying calculations).  Following 
Professor Neil Cohen’s suggestion to use  confidence intervals, rather than mere 
point estimates, the calculations in this article present both.  See generally Neil Cohen, 
Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985).  For a critique of this approach, see D.H. Kaye, Apples and 
Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 54 
(1987).  For a reply, see Neil Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabilities: 
A Response to Professor Kaye, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 78 (1987). 
 22 In this example (36 exposed people suffer ailment Y, and 20 unexposed 
people), the result is statistically significant at p = .05.  For this level of significance, 
the critical point value of t is 1.65, and the observed point value of t, in the 
comparison of the two samples, is 2.13, which falls in the critical range.  The 
confidence interval for the comparison is .007-.057.  The null hypothesis is that 
exposure has no bearing on the number of ailing people.  The null hypothesis 
assumes an observed value of t below 1.65, and assumes that the confidence interval 
will span the number 0 or fall below it.  Since the observed point value of t exceeds 
the critical value of t, and since the confidence interval spans a range above 0, the 
result is statistically significant. 
 23 I recognize that this standard has itself become controversial if taken as a 
minimum requirement for evidence offered in civil cases, and I return to this subject 
in Part III.  See infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text. 
 24 The reason a narrow confidence interval is better is that it indicates greater 
precision in the test.  If results would be expected to exceed or fall below 14-15 only 
5% of the time, the test is more precise than one in which the results would be 
expected to exceed or fall below 10-20 only 5% of the time.  See HURLBURT, supra 
note 21, at 263 (noting with approval that journal editors “often require authors to 
report confidence intervals”).  In the case of comparative risk, an interval spanning 1 
(point of no correlation between exposure and ailment) would not be significant.  
See REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 19, at 173 (explaining that with p value of .05, “a 
confidence interval would indicate the range of relative risk values that would result 
95% of the time if the study were repeated,” so, the width of the confidence interval 
indicates “the precision of the point estimate of relative risk,” and narrower 
confidence intervals thus indicate more confidence in the resulting estimate; 
however, where interval spans critical value, a relative risk of 1.0, the results are not 
significant). 
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unexposed group.  In this case, combing the epidemiological study 
with our knowledge of the plaintiff would suggest that agent X 
probably did cause his ailment.  The reason is that more than half the 
observed instances of ailment Y in the exposed population were 
caused by agent X, so any one person in the group is more likely than 
not to have become ill from exposure to agent X.  The result of this 
test, by the way, would once again satisfy the conventional notion of 
statistical significance.25 
In fact, however, the situation is seldom so simple.  The 
probative force of such proof turns on such things as levels of 
exposure (time and dose), adequate sampling techniques, specificity 
of symptoms measured, and controlling for extrinsic (or potentially 
confounding) variables.26  Moreover, taking seriously the conventions 
of statistical significance described above, even outcomes showing 
more than a doubling of incremental risk would not necessarily 
persuade scientists to draw any conclusions.27  Also, a relative risk in 
the neighborhood of two is not as high as it sounds (scientists often 
see far higher relative risks).28 
 
 25 In this example (42 exposed people suffer ailment Y and 20 unexposed 
people), the result is statistically significant at p = .05.  For this level of significance, 
the critical point value of t is 1.65, and the observed point value of t, in the 
comparison of the two samples, is 2.93, which falls in the critical range.  The 
confidence interval for the comparison is .019-.069.  Again the null hypothesis is that 
exposure has no bearing on the number of ailing people.  The null hypothesis 
assumes an observed value of t below 1.65, and assumes that the confidence interval 
would span the number 0, or fall below it.  Since the observed point value of t 
exceeds the critical value of t and since the confidence interval spans a range above 
0, the result is statistically significant. 
 26 See generally LEON GORDIS, EPIDEMIOLOGY 192-95, 204-17 (2d ed. 2000) 
(describing guidelines for studies of problems in causation, which require 
researchers to consider: (1) temporal relationship; (2) strength of association; (3) 
dose-response relationship; (4) replication of findings; (5) biologic plausibility; (6) 
consideration of alternative explanations; (7) cessation of exposure; (8) specificity of 
association; and (9) consistency with other knowledge).  Other problems in 
epidemiological studies include: (a) selection bias; (b) information bias; (c) 
confounding factors; and (d) interaction.  Id.; see also Barrow v. Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co., No. 96-689-Civ-Orl-19B, 1998 WL 812318, at *23 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 1998).  This 
case describes the Bradford-Hill criteria for appraising epidemiological proof of 
causation, which include: 
(1) the strength of the association or how far above 1.0 is the relative 
risk; (2) the consistency of the association or its reproducibility; (3) the 
specificity of the signs and symptoms or whether they are unusual and 
distinctive; (4) the dose response; (5) the temporality; and (6) the 
biologic plausibility of the theory of causation. 
Id. 
 27 See infra example 4, note 71 and accompanying text. 
 28 See, e.g., Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1212 (10th Cir. 
2002) (noting study results that indicate that the relative risk of stroke in post-partum 
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Putting aside these problems, commentators are right that 
epidemiological studies should be admissible to show general 
causation even if relative risk is less than two, and a few decisions do 
miss this point.29  When the purpose is to prove specific cause, it 
makes sense to insist on relative risk exceeding two because such 
proof is mathematically sufficient to satisfy the preponderance 
standard.  But even this restriction assumes that there is no other 
evidence of exposure: If there is other evidence, then even 
epidemiological proof that does not show a doubling of risk is still 
relevant as partial proof of specific cause.  Many modern decisions 
(state and federal) approve epidemiological evidence showing a 
relative risk less than two,30 and many demonstrate good 
understanding of this idea.31  Decisions refusing to accept the proof 
when it shows a relative risk less than two often do so for other 
reasons, and not on the basis of simple misunderstanding.32 
 
women is 28.3, as compared with  non-pregnant women); Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 
94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 336 (E.D. N.Y. 2000) (noting in cigarette smoking case that risks 
of lung cancer are 5 times higher for asbestos workers than for other workers, 50 
times higher if asbestos workers smoke cigarettes, and 87 times higher if asbestos 
workers smoke more than a pack a day); In re Joint Eastern and S. Dist. Asbestos 
Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (reporting relative risk of lung cancer 
in cigarette smokers as compared to nonsmokers is “on the order of 10:1”). 
 29 Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, 950 F. Supp. 981, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 
1996) (holding that plaintiff’s proof is not founded on epidemiological evidence 
showing relative risk greater than 2.0, “or some other evidence” of causation, so the 
evidence does not have “a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry” under 
Daubert and stating that a relative risk of less than 2.0 “may suggest teratogenicity, but 
actually tends to disprove legal causation”). 
 30 Among federal cases, see In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 
1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002), which held that the trial court erred in requiring that 
epidemiological evidence show a relative risk greater than 2.0 and further stated that, 
to show “generic causation,” plaintiffs only needed scientific evidence that radiation 
“was capable of causing” injuries such as those suffered by plaintiff.  Among state 
cases, see McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997), 
which adopted the Daubert standard, and also rejected the defense claim that 
epidemiological evidence is admissible only if it shows relative risk exceeding 2.0. 
 31 See In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 712 n.166 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting passage 
from REFERENCE MANUAL); Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 
(11th Cir. 1999) (finding a relative risk exceeding 2.0 permits “an inference that the 
plaintiff’s disease was more likely than not caused by the agent,” yet noting that no 
one doubts that smoking can cause heart disease even though relative risk in that 
setting is only 1.5); In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1028 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that an epidemiologist might find cause where relative risk 
is less than 2.0, but a “more likely than not” test “is not satisfied by epidemiological 
evidence alone” unless relative risk exceeds 2.0). 
 32 See Allison, 184 F.3d at 1315 (approving exclusion of evidence showing relative 
risk of 1.24 because “it was so significantly close to 1.0 that the court thought the 
study was not worth serious consideration for proving causation” in a breast implant 
case). 
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Another supposed rule holds that evidence of differential 
diagnosis cannot be admitted to show that agent X caused plaintiff to 
suffer ailment Y unless there is additional proof of general cause—
whether epidemiological or based on animal studies—that agent X 
does cause ailment Y in some people.  Such proof is popular because 
it is less expensive, and it can be provided by treating physicians who 
are not toxicologists or epidemiologists.  Essentially the physician 
testifies that she tried to account for the ailment in other ways, 
through testing or treatment regimens, and thus eliminated all other 
possible or likely causes except agent X.  Here the cases conflict.  
Some hold that differential diagnosis can only eliminate other causes, 
and because the technique is necessarily uncertain (it is hard to know 
when one has eliminated all but one cause), it can only supplement 
affirmative proof that agent X sometimes causes such ailments.33  
Other cases admit such proof without such preconditions, accepting 
it as relevant to show causation.34  There is no settled rule, and courts 
seem to be trying hard to distinguish between testimony that does 
eliminate other plausible risks, and testimony that does not.35  In 
other words, the decisions seem to draw sensible qualitative 
distinctions that connect with the task that Daubert asks courts to 
perform.36 
 
 33 See e.g., Rider, 295 F.3d at 1194, 1199 (affirming summary judgment for 
defendant in a Parlodel suit after a Daubert hearing because the proffered evidence 
of causation was not sufficient to prove causation; also finding that case reports based 
on differential diagnosis could not by themselves prove causal link “because they 
report symptoms observed in a single patient in an uncontrolled context,” which can 
“rule out other potential causes” but cannot rule out the possibility that the observed 
effect “is simply idiosyncratic or the result of unknown confounding factors,” so such 
reports “may support other proof of causation,” but “ordinarily cannot prove 
causation” by themselves); Hollander, 289 F.3d at 1210-11; Glastetter v. Novartis 
Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 2001) (containing an analysis similar to 
Rider). 
 34 Mattis v. Carlton Elec. Prods. 295 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2002) (admitting 
differential diagnosis testimony in electrician’s suit against a maker of PVCs as 
sufficient to prove causation, where a physician “ruled out other possible causes,” 
including “smoking, asthma, or ammonia,” and concluded that plaintiff developed 
reactive airways syndrome “as a result of his exposure to Carlon cement fumes”). 
 35 See Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibilty of Differential Diagnosis 
Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive 
Law, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 137 (2001) (stating that Daubert has led to 
“greater skepticism” about differential diagnosis testimony, but that courts have 
reached a “fair degree of consensus” on questions such as whether the proponent 
must first offer “ruling-in” evidence before offering “ruling-out” testimony and on 
the sufficiency of proof resting largely on “temporal order”). 
 36 Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating 
that differential diagnosis “normally should not be excluded because the expert has 
failed to rule out every possible alternative cause,” but that testimony may be 
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Of course both of these “rules” could be deployed unwisely to 
block just claims.  It might even be true that a Daubert regime 
provides greater opportunity for courts to make such mistakes than 
Frye did.  Certainly the most liberal “Rule 702” standard in current 
use, in which courts look at credentials and apply the “helpfulness” 
standard, would less often lead to exclusion of such evidence.  But 
such proof should be excluded when it is thin, and looking directly at 
the science seems a good thing, not a bad thing. 
These supposed “rules” also invite the criticism that courts are 
applying Daubert to measure the sufficiency of scientific evidence, 
rather than its relevancy.37  Some opinions appear to collapse notions 
of relevancy and sufficiency.  That is not the fault of Daubert, however, 
and other modern decisions clearly understand the difference 
between relevance and sufficiency in this setting.38  In partial answer 
to this criticism, it is worth noting that a court asked to rule on an 
offer of proof sometimes should exclude the evidence because it is 
insufficient.  In other contexts, it is perfectly conventional for courts 
to sustain objections on the ground that evidence does not suffice to 
prove the point for which it is offered.39  There is absolutely nothing 
wrong with doing so, at least in cases in which the proponent has no 
additional evidence on the point in question and has had an 
adequate opportunity to advise the court about the proof that he 
does have and to make the usual proffer. 
 
 
 
excluded where it fails to consider other potential causes).  The court in Cooper 
found that the record was “replete with evidence that smoking can cause non-unions 
to occur,” and that plaintiff was a pack-a-day smoker for 25 years, a fact that expert 
“categorically dismissed.” 
 37 See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Daubert Revisited: Disturbing Implications, 22 
CHAMPION 18 (May 1998) (criticizing federal courts that have invoked the “fit” or 
“relevancy” prong of Daubert to insist that epidemiological proof satisfy what amounts 
to a sufficiency standard). 
 38 See Joint Dist. Asbestos Liab. Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1133, 1137 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(stating that “Daubert did not alter the traditional sufficiency standard” and reversing 
the trial court’s judgment for defendant as matter of law because the trial court 
“erred in ruling that plaintiff presented insufficient epidemiological and clinical 
evidence” to prove causation). 
 39 See, e.g., Tennison v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 244 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 
2001); Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285, 296 (3d 
Cir. 1963), aff’d, 378 U.S. 123 (both rejecting offers of proof because the evidence 
could not prove the point for which it was offered unless other evidence was offered, 
which offeror did not include or could not obtain). 
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C.  Daubert and Erie 
Professor Margaret Berger offers another criticism of what she 
takes to be the judge-made doubling rule.40  Imposing this rule in 
federal diversity suits, she argues, violates the Erie doctrine.  Stated in 
its strongest terms, the argument is that this judge-made rule, created 
in a Daubert-inspired construction of FRE 702, is substantive and is 
intended to affect outcome in a particular class of cases.  Drawing on 
a modern opinion by Judge Posner in the Healy case, Professor 
Berger suggests that federal courts must apply any state substantive 
rule that is “in actual conflict” with a Federal Rule, and any “state 
procedural rule” that applies to “a particular substantive area.”41  Lest 
anyone think the decision in Hanna stands in the way because it puts 
the Federal Rules beyond Erie-based challenge, Professor Berger 
reminds us that a prominent modern decision requires federal courts 
to apply state substantive law even when a Federal Rule is in play.42  
She concludes that when a state court interprets evidence law “so as 
to better a plaintiff’s odds of prevailing in toxic tort litigation,”43 the 
result is a state rule applying in a particular class of cases, so federal 
courts must observe it.  Perhaps more importantly, the state rule is 
substantive because it creates an incentive for manufacturers “to take 
more care in testing their products.”44 
This is a brave and inventive argument.  There is something to 
be said for the proposition that if the state and federal systems 
persistently produce different outcomes in similar cases, on account 
of what seems to be different standards of proof, while purporting to 
apply the same substantive principles, the result would be 
troublesome.  I concur in Professor Berger’s argument that federal 
courts should consider state precedents on matters closely related to 
sufficiency standards, and on evidential conventions that seem closely 
 
 40 See generally Berger, supra note 15. 
 41 See S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 309 (7th 
Cir. 1995), cited twice with approval in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 
415, 428 n.7, 429 (1996).  Erie refers to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938). 
 42 The reference in this text is to Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).  The 
modern decision is Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996) (holding 
that, in diversity suits, federal courts must apply state statute controlling 
compensation awards for excessiveness or inadequacy; noting, however, that the 
statute directs appellate courts to exercise this power, while  in the federal system, 
the trial judge must take this responsibility). 
 43 Berger, supra note 15, at 319. 
 44 The indicated conclusion is that a contrary judge-made federal rule violates 
the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2003), or the Rules Enabling Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2003) in its modern formulation. Berger, supra note 15, at 312-19. 
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related to substantive principles.  Federal courts often do just that,45 
but most of the time they do not view themselves as bound by state 
law, and it seems telling that Judge Posner himself goes to great 
lengths to avoid being bound by state rules relating to proof in tort 
cases.46 
In the end, the Erie argument seems misconceived.  To begin 
with, federal decisions don’t impose a “doubling rule” for 
epidemiological evidence (instead they analyze and assess probative 
worth and sufficiency).  More importantly, different results on this 
question seem epistemological, rather than policy-driven.  What I 
mean by epistemological is that the differences look like variations in 
attempts by federal and state judges to implement the “sufficient 
evidence” standard by deciding “how much evidence is enough” to 
allow a reasonable juror to find that cause has been proved under the 
preponderance standard.  If the results were policy-driven, one would 
expect to see opinions linking the discussion of “how much is 
enough” to particular substantive standards, or to the purposes of tort 
law as compensatory and loss-spreading or as shifting to 
manufacturers only actual costs of injury while keeping innovation 
alive and costs down.  One would also expect policy-based decisions 
to generate bright-line rules, or even statutes governing recurrent 
situations. 
Of course judges might mask their decisions, justifying them 
 
 45 See Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(noting in a breast implant case that Erie requires application of state substantive 
standards and commenting, with reference to evidence of relative risk, that state law 
requires proof based on “reasonable medical probability,” interpreted to mean “the 
functional equivalent of preponderance of the evidence”); In re Simon II Litig., 211 
F.R.D. 86, 157 (E.D. N.Y. 2002) (commenting that allowing “statistical proof” of 
causation in cigarette smoking litigation does not conflict with Erie because there is 
“no ruling New York case which holds that state substantive law will not permit the 
use of modern aggregation forensic tools to support a massive fraud action”). 
 46 See S.A. Healy Co., 60 F.3d at 309-10.  Judge Posner, writing the opinion in 
Healy, cites two tort cases in which the Erie issue is “pretty easy” because the state rule 
is “limited to a particular substantive area.”  Id.  Judge Posner authored both prior 
opinions, and both times he avoided applying the state rule.  See also Barron v. Ford 
Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd., 965 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a state statute 
blocking proof that claimant was not wearing seatbelt was substantive, but that it did 
not apply where defendant claimed that seatbelts were a design element relevant to 
the question whether it was reasonable  to make sunroof out of laminated glass); 
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing to apply 
a state rule letting plaintiff prove design change, because a federal rule blocks it; 
noting that the matter is both substantive and procedural, but that it would be 
“melodramatic” to label federal rule as substantive and require federal courts to 
apply state counterpart) (at the time, state and federal rule were textually identical, 
but state and federal courts diverged on question whether rule excludes such proof). 
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epistemologically rather than by reference to substantive policy.  
Indeed, humanly speaking it is hard to imagine deciding whether 
indirect proof of cause suffices unless one also thinks about 
substantive policies, and what is humanly at stake—a serious injury or 
ailment on one side, the future of a drug on the other.  But if every 
judicial attempt to think epistemologically (hence procedurally) is 
viewed as a masked effort to implement policy choices, then the Erie 
doctrine is doomed.  We would be forced to the conclusion that 
federal courts cannot at the same time operate as “an independent 
system for administering justice” as contemplated by Justice Brennan 
in Byrd47 while complying with Erie’s command to honor state 
substantive policy choices.  Professor Berger does not make such an 
extravagant claim, but her contention that federal judges are 
sometimes implementing substantive policy choices comes close to 
that, since the opinions do not say that they are behaving in this way.48 
In any event, the federal decisions that have noticed this issue 
have mostly avoided concluding that Erie mandates following state 
practice on this point.49  On the root question whether a state or 
federal standard governs the sufficiency question in diversity 
litigation, there is stronger support for the proposition that federal 
law governs than there is for applying a state standard.50 
 
 47 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). 
 48 See Berger, supra note 15, at 301-06 (noting that in federal decisions “insisting 
on epidemiological proof” or those insisting that a plaintiff’s epidemiological 
evidence show a relative risk exceeding 2.0, judges “are not making value-free 
determinations that are the inevitable consequences of a system of rational proof”). 
 49 See Bartley v. Euclid, Inc., 158 F.3d 261, 272-73 & n9 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding 
that if state law requires the evidence to show more than doubled risk in the exposed 
population, the proof satisfied the standard; if this requirement defines burden of 
proof, it is arguably “procedural rather than substantive, and therefore controlled by 
federal rather than state law”) (dissent argues that state rule is substantive); Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 198, 259 
(rejecting defense claim, in smoking case, that Erie required federal courts to require 
“proof of individual injury,” and commenting that the question is “better posed as a 
question of legal sufficiency”; if mixture of statistical and individualized evidence can 
prove cause, then “no Erie question is presented by federal evidentiary procedures 
which allow for the use of aggregate proof”); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F 
.Supp. 1387, 1394-95(D. Or. 1996) (rejecting a claim that Erie required the federal 
court to apply state rule relating to proof of causation in breast implant suit).  But see 
Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 942, 948 n.4 
(E.D. Ark. 1998) (stating that if the application of a “federal evidentiary rule” leads 
to dismissal, whereas the application of the state  rule would not, “then, under Erie, 
the evidentiary ruling might be considered substantive rather than procedural”); 
Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a 
“question of sufficiency would be a substantive rule under Erie”). 
 50 See generally 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 2525 (2d ed. 1995) (opining that many courts now agree that 
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D.  The 2000 Amendments 
The amendments to FRE 702 adopted in 2000 reinforce 
Daubert’s message that courts are to take a close and independent 
look at evidence proffered as science, and increase the difficulties of 
arguing under Erie that rulings on sufficiency are substantive.  In 
effect, these amendments say that everything that could affect validity 
and accuracy count.  Not only should courts insure that scientific 
testimony “is the product of reliable principles and methods,” which 
was the actual holding of Daubert, and not only should courts insure 
that scientific evidence rests on “sufficient facts or data,” which was 
part of the sufficiency calculus that courts perform under FRCP 50 
and sometimes in connection with rulings on offers of proof under 
FRE 103, but courts should also take steps to ensure that the witness 
“has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts.”51 
The latter provision resolves a conflict among the cases in favor 
of more judicial scrutiny.  This language directs trial judges to 
consider issues of laboratory protocol in determining whether to 
admit or exclude expert testimony, meaning that these issues affect 
not merely weight, but admissibility.  Some pre-amendment authority 
had pointed toward this conclusion, but other decisions pointed 
toward the opposite conclusion.52  Whether the 2000 amendments 
 
“principle seems to require that the federal court apply the federal test”)(internal 
citation omitted); Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1323-24 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (stating that it is settled under Erie that “federal law controls questions of 
the sufficiency of the evidence in state law claims”); Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 
365, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that “in diversity cases federal courts apply a 
federal rather than a state test for the sufficiency of evidence to create a jury 
question”) (en banc).  Contra Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 511 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that state law determines sufficiency). 
 51 FED. R. EVID. 702.  The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 2000 
amendments to FRE 702 states that it is “important” that the “application” of 
principles and methods “be conducted reliably,” and cites an opinion by Judge 
Becker.  As the author of the opinion in Downing, which anticipated Daubert and was 
cited there with approval, Judge Becker has been unusually active and innovative in 
dealing constructively with problems of scientific evidence.  See United States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).  Elsewhere Judge Becker endorsed the 
proposition that judges should assess not only validity and accuracy of principles, but 
issues of application.  See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 
1994) (finding that “any step” making expert testimony “unreliable” also makes it 
inadmissible, regardless whether it “completely changes a reliable methodology or 
merely misapplies” it). 
 52 Compare United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating 
that under Daubert the court should require expert to show that he “properly 
performed the protocols involved in DNA profiling”), with Unites States v. Chischilly, 
30 F.3d 1144, 1154 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that questions relating to conduct of 
laboratory procedures go to weight, not admissibility), and United States v. Shea, 211 
F.3d 658, 668 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that flaws in application of methodology go to 
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will have real impact on the way courts deal with scientific evidence 
has yet to be seen.  These changes have not yet been widely adopted 
by the states, perhaps because they have not had enough time to 
consider the matter.53 
III.  DAUBERT PROPERLY CONCEIVES SCIENCE, AND TAKES THE RIGHT 
LEGAL STANCE TOWARD SCIENCE 
Critics complain that Daubert is incoherent, perhaps even 
internally conflicted, in two critical respects—in its view of science, 
and in its conception of the proper relationship between science and 
law.54  There is power in these observations, but I mean to say once 
again that Daubert is not at fault.  Indeed, one of the strengths of the 
opinion is that its vision is broad enough to embrace internal 
tensions and difficulties in science, and in the relationship between 
law and science, that cannot be avoided.  For us in the scholarly 
community, and for judges toiling in the vineyards, the “task at 
hand”55 is to make our way toward appropriate accommodations of 
 
weight, not admissibility); also compare People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 996 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding that pretrial hearing should determine whether “the 
experiments and calculations performed by the testing laboratory in the particular 
case yielded results sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury,” and factual issues 
relating to “the reliability of any particular test” can affect weight, but can also show 
that the evidence is “inadmissible as a matter of law”), with Fishback v. People, 851 
P.2d 884, 893 (Colo. 1993) (matters of “implementation and execution” go to 
weight, not admissibility) (applying Frye standard).  See also People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 
68, 73-9 (Colo. 2001) (discarding Frye and adopting standard similar to Daubert; 
noting that some courts consider that matters of implementation of methods affect 
admissibility, but not taking a position on this issue); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The 
Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation for the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The 
Importance of Human Error as a Cause of Forensic Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 19 
(1991) (matters of laboratory protocol should affect admissibility, not just weight). 
 53 I am aware of one state that has apparently adopted the new language.  See 
MISS. R. EVID. 702 (adopting the new federal language).  In Colorado, the state 
Supreme Court rejected a recommendation by its Evidence Rules Advisory 
Committee to adopt the federal language, after I argued unsuccessfully in favor of its 
adoption.  The expressed concern was that adopting language that seemed so closely 
related to Daubert would essentially adopt Daubert itself, a questionable position given 
that Colorado had just rejected the Frye standard, in order to adopt its own standard, 
which is similar to, but not identical with, Daubert.  See Shreck, 22 P.3d at 73-79 
(requiring trial courts to consider reliability of expert testimony, qualifications of 
witness, and usefulness of testimony, thus endorsing the Daubert factors without 
adopting Daubert). 
 54 See Jan Beyea and Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert 
Gatekeepers: The Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 
327 (2001); see also Margaret Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: 
Epistemology and Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183 (1994). 
 55 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (characterizing the responsibility of trial judge to 
include ensuring that an expert’s testimony “rests on a reliable foundation and is 
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these difficulties. 
Let us consider first the charge that Daubert’s view of science is 
incoherent.  On the one hand, we can see in the core of the opinion 
(the part that adopts the validity standard and speaks of accuracy and 
propositions that can be tested or “falsified”) an apparent belief that 
science is a static body of objective knowledge reflecting certainty.  
On the other hand, we also find in Daubert suggestions that (a) 
science is a process, hence anything but static; (b) scientific 
knowledge does not reflect certainty, but is uncertain and contingent; 
and (c) scientific expertise is affected by the forces that generate 
litigation, hence subjective in some respects, and socially constructed.56  
This incoherent view, it is said, makes the task that Daubert sets for 
judges impossible to perform: In effect, Daubert charges them to apply 
static objective standards in appraising shifting subjective, contingent 
knowledge. 
Let us consider the relationship between law and science, as 
Daubert envisions it.  On the one hand, Daubert affirms that it is the 
job of courts to appraise science, and courts are not simply to defer to 
the scientific community on the question whether evidence 
presented as science is valid and reliable.  This role for courts is what 
we mean by “gatekeeping.”  On the other hand, Daubert says courts 
are to judge science by the standards that scientists deploy in judging 
science.  Kumho Tire adds an exclamation point in commenting that 
scientists are to bring to the courtroom “the same level of intellectual 
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant 
field.”57  Again this incoherent view asks courts to do what they cannot 
do and fails to recognize that science and law have different agendas, 
goals and purposes, and operate under different constraints. 
A.  A Defective View of Science? 
On the question whether Daubert has a defective view of science, 
I would begin by suggesting that the problem of objectivity has a 
familiar ring, perhaps because bridging the gap between human 
perceptions and the world has engaged philosophers for thousands 
of years, and the conversation is not over yet.  How surprising is it to 
 
relevant to the task at hand”); see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (explaining how 
judges apply Daubert factors “to the case at hand”). 
 56 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 596 (noting that “arguably, there are no certainties in 
science,” and commenting that science is “a process for proposing and refining 
theoretical explanations about the world,” making it qualitatively different from the 
law). 
 57 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. 
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find that philosophers and historians of science report that science 
too is not the wholly objective edifice that we outsiders envision?  
Thomas Kuhn’s salient work argues that the choice between what he 
called “competing paradigms” in science “cannot be determined 
merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal 
science.”58  The philosopher of science Karl Popper, of whom we have 
heard because Daubert draws on his work, takes a similar position.  In 
defending the proposition that science is distinguished from other 
forms of knowledge by the fact that it can be “falsified,” he argued 
that a proposition can be falsified only by a “basic statement,” 
meaning a singular empirical statement that is accepted because it 
has been tested “inter-subjectively” rather than objectively.59 
Yet views as skeptical as these cannot long survive unchallenged 
in a world that has seen such extraordinary accomplishments as laser 
surgery, the internet, space stations and jet airline travel.  Obviously 
science has answers to critical questions, and Kuhn and Popper both 
recognized as much.  What Kuhn called “normal science” proceeds, 
he wrote, out of random early “fact-gathering” toward something 
resembling “an accepted model or pattern” that he called a 
“paradigm,” which succeeds because it is more successful than other 
paradigms “in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners 
has come to recognize as acute.”  “Mopping-up” operations that are 
“what engage most scientists throughout their careers,” and these 
proceed after the adoption of a paradigm, and constitute “normal 
science.”60  In the end, what counts most as a critical criterion of 
scientific paradigms is predictive accuracy.61  Popper was less direct in 
suggesting a positive account of scientific knowledge, but he did 
comment that scientists reach a kind of stopping point with 
“statements about whose acceptance or rejection the various 
investigators are likely to reach agreement,” and he acknowledged 
that we must find such stopping points or end in a new “Babel of 
 
 58 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 94 (3d ed. 1996). 
 59 KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY §§ 8, 22, 28, 29 (Routledge 
Classics 2002) (stating that a theory can be “falsified” only by means of “a reproducible 
effect which refutes the theory”). 
 60 KUHN, supra note 58, at 15, 23, 25-27 (these “mopping-up” operations involve 
investigating those facts that “the paradigm has shown to be particularly revealing of 
the nature of things,” as well as facts that lack “intrinsic interest” but “can be 
compared directly with predictions” from the paradigm). 
 61 THOMAS S. KUHN, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice, in INTRODUCTORY 
READINGS TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 436 (Klemke et al. eds., 3d ed. 1998)(listing 
“as characteristics of a good scientific theory” the following factors: accuracy, 
consistency, breadth of scope, and fruitfulness in the sense of encouraging new 
phenomena or previously unnoticed relationships). 
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Tongues” in which scientific discovery “would be reduced to 
absurdity,” and “the soaring edifice of science would soon lie in 
ruins.”62 
Perhaps Daubert should be faulted for being too skeptical of 
science.  As Professor Ron Allen argues, it seems odd to posit as a 
standard of scientific validity the question whether a proposition can 
be “falsified” as opposed to “verified” or “confirmed.”  Arguably such 
a standard is too demanding if we wind up accepting scientific 
knowledge only if it has been tested in every conceivable way,63 and 
Thomas Kuhn took issue with the very idea of “falsification” in an 
account that stresses more positive notions of verification.64  But I do 
not believe Daubert meant to erect a barrier as high as that.  It may be 
comforting to consider that Popper, in explaining why he chose 
“falsifiability” as the central criterion of science, says his purpose was 
to distinguish science from myth and metaphysics.  Specifically he 
had in mind the claims of Carl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Alfred 
Adler, which he viewed as “pseudo-science” more closely resembling 
astrology than astronomy.65  Popper did not actually argue that 
nothing could be accepted until it was tested so exhaustively that 
nobody could doubt it.  Rather, he argued that a scientific 
 
 62 POPPER, supra note 59, § 29 (characterizing this situation as “a failure of 
language as a means of universal communication”). 
 63 See Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1169-71 (1994) (arguing that Daubert “adopted uncritically the 
view that Popperian falsifiability is at the heart of modern science,” showing “no 
awareness” that that view is controversial and inadequate because it suggests that 
science produces knowledge only if it survives “all conceivable tests,” but fails to 
account for the accomplishments of scientists, who “do not believe that all they know 
are negatives,” and know “a lot of positive truths” too).  For a reply to this criticism, 
see Sean O’Connor, The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science: Will the Real Karl Popper 
Please Stand Up?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 263 (1995). 
 64 KUHN, supra note 58, at 145-47 (describing “probabilistic verification theories” 
that “compare the given scientific theory with all others that might be imagined to 
fit” the data, or construct by imagination “all the tests that the given scientific theory 
‘might conceivably be asked to pass,’ and doubting that any test can falsify any theory 
because “no theory ever solves all the puzzles,” and indeed “it is just the 
incompleteness and imperfection of the existing data-theory fit that, at any time, 
define many of the puzzles that characterize normal science”). 
 65 Karl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations, in INTRODUCTORY READINGS TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 38-40 (Klemke et al. eds.) (describing a conversation 
with Adler in which the author had mentioned a child, whom Adler had “no 
difficulty in analyzing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although he had 
not even seen the child,” because, as Adler said, he had “thousandfold experience,” 
leading the author to conclude that that Adler’s “previous observations may not have 
been much sounder than this new one,” proving only that any case “could be 
interpreted in light of the theory”). 
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proposition is one that can be tested.66  And of course the Popper 
account tracks a salient feature of the scientific method, which is to 
test a hypothesis to see whether experimental results refute it (testing 
the “null hypothesis” in common parlance). 
In sum, what we might take as incoherence or internal conflict 
in Daubert’s view of science can also be understood more 
constructively as a kind of dualism that embodies a view of science 
similar to what we find in Kuhn and Popper.  Rather than 
abandoning any search for a validity standard, this dualistic view 
should lead us to recognize, in words that Professor Nance might find 
congenial,67 that reliability is not an all-or-nothing concept, but a 
relative concept: Often it will be possible to insist on a kind of 
“certainty” of the sort that we have in mind when we speak of the 
tides or the hour of sunrise, but other times we can only expect the 
sort of “certainty” that we have when we say that asbestos causes some 
kinds of lung cancer. 
B.  Misconceived Relationship between Law and Science? 
A serious criticism of Daubert is that courts are being led to 
demand a higher level of statistical significance than is appropriate.  
Epidemiological evidence might support the conclusion that 
exposure to agent X increases the risk of ailment Y, thus in turn 
supporting an inference of general causation (agent X causes some 
instances of ailment Y).  Alternatively, it might support the 
conclusion that exposure more than doubles the risk, thus in turn 
supporting an inference of general causation and perhaps even 
specific causation (plaintiff was exposed and is ailing, and so agent X 
is the cause). 
To illustrate these points, consider some examples comparing 
500-person samples (one group exposed to agent X, one not 
exposed).  Example 1 (risk increase): We find that thirty-six exposed 
people have ailment Y, but only twenty unexposed people.  These 
numbers suggest that ailment Y suffered by sixteen out of thirty-six 
 
 66 LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 59, § 22 (we must “clearly 
distinguish between falsifiability and falsification”); see also Conjectures and Refutations, 
supra note 65, at 43 (task is not to identify “meaningfulness or significance” or 
“truth” or “acceptability,” but rather to distinguish statements and systems belonging 
to “the empirical sciences” from all others, whether “psychoanalytic” or “myth” or 
something else; the latter are not “unimportant, or insignificant,” and “may contain 
important anticipations of scientific theories”; indeed, psychoanalytic theories 
“contain most interesting psychological suggestions, but not in a testable form”). 
 67 See Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. 
REV. __ (upcoming in Fall 2003). 
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exposed people came from agent X, that relative risk is 1.8, and that 
there is a .444 probability that agent X caused any given case of 
ailment Y in the exposed population.68  Example 2 (risk increase): In 
the exposed group, twenty-nine people have ailment Y; again only 
twenty in the unexposed group.  These numbers suggest that ailment 
Y suffered by nine out of twenty-nine exposed people came from 
agent X, that relative risk is 1.45, and that there is a .310 probability 
that agent X caused any given case of ailment Y in the exposed 
population.69  Example 3 (risk more than doubled): We find that 
forty-two exposed people have ailment Y, but only twenty unexposed 
people have it.  These numbers suggest that the ailments suffered by 
twenty-two out of forty-two exposed people came from agent X, that 
relative risk is 2.1, and that there is a .542 probability that agent X 
caused any given case of ailment Y in the exposed population.70  
Example 4 (risk more than doubled): We find that five exposed 
people have ailment Y, and only two unexposed people.  These 
numbers suggest that the ailments suffered by five out of seven 
exposed people came from agent X, that relative risk is 3.5, and that 
there is a probability of .714 that agent X caused any given case of 
ailment Y in the exposed population.71 
 
 68 In this example (36 exposed and 20 unexposed people suffer the ailment) 
recall from note 22 that the result is statistically significant at p = .05.  The observed 
value of t exceeds the critical value of t, and the confidence interval for the 
comparison is .007 to.057, which lies above the value of 0 that the null hypothesis 
would assume. 
 69 In this example (29 exposed  and 20 unexposed people suffer the ailment) the 
result is not statistically significant at p = .05.  For this level of significance, the critical 
point value of t is 1.65, and the observed point value of t, in the comparison of the 
two samples is 1.28, which falls below the critical range.  The confidence interval for 
the comparison of the two samples is -.005-.041.  Again the null hypothesis is that 
exposure has no bearing on the number of ailing people.  The null hypothesis 
assumes an observed value of t below 1.65, and assumes that the confidence interval 
will span the number 0.  Since the observed point value of t is less than 1.65, and 
since the confidence interval does span 0, the result is not statistically significant (we 
do not reject the null hypothesis). 
 70 In this example (42 exposed people suffer the ailment, and 20 unexposed 
people), recall from note 25 that the result is statistically significant at p = .05.  The 
observed value of t exceeds the critical value of t, and the confidence interval for the 
comparison is .019-.069, which lies above the value of 0 that the null hypothesis 
would assume. 
 71 In this example (5 exposed people suffer the ailment, and 2 unexposed 
people), the result is not statistically significant at p = .05.  For this level of 
significance, the critical point value of t is 1.65, and the observed point value of t, in 
the comparison of the two samples, is 1.2, which falls below the critical range.  The 
confidence interval for the comparison of the two samples is -.002-.014.  Again the 
null hypothesis is that exposure has no bearing on the number of ailing people.  The 
null hypothesis assumes an observed value of t below 1.65, and assumes that the 
confidence interval will span the number 0.  Since the observed point value of t is less 
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The usual approach to the question whether agent X causes 
ailment Y is to begin with the “null hypothesis” that there is no 
correlation.  If that were so, then in the two samples (500 exposed 
people; 500 unexposed people) the number of observed instances of 
ailment Y would be the same.  But the outcome of studies may 
suggest, as do Examples 1-4 above, that the null hypothesis should be 
rejected, and that agent X does indeed cause ailment Y.  Let us begin 
by understanding the meaning of these outcomes.  To start with, the 
suggested conclusions are all general and qualified, and each can be 
deployed to state a probability, but not a certainty.  The conclusions 
are all general because they suggest that agent X is a causal factor in 
the mass of observed instances of ailment Y.  The conclusions are 
qualified because they suggest that agent X causes certain 
percentages of observed instances of ailment Y in exposed 
populations.  The conclusions can be deployed to state probabilities 
because they suggest that, among ailing and exposed people, there 
are certain probabilities, equal to the percentages suggested by the 
figures, that any given instance of ailment Y was caused by agent X. 
In the description set forth above, Examples 1 and 2 indicate 
that exposure raises the risk but does not double it, thus supporting 
inferences of general cause.  Examples 3 and 4 indicate that exposure 
more than doubles the risk, thus supporting inferences of both 
general and specific cause.  Epidemiologists would likely accept the 
conclusions indicated by Examples 1 and 3, because they are 
statistically significant at the level of p = .05, meaning that there is but 
one chance in twenty that the numbers would appear by chance—by 
random and inevitable differences in 500-person samples taken from 
the general population.  Epidemiologists would likely reject the 
conclusions indicated by Examples 2 and 4 because they are not 
statistically significant at this level.  The effect of this convention is to 
discourage “false positives” in favor of “false negatives,” or (as it is 
sometimes said) to discourage α-errors by incurring more β-errors, or 
discourage Type I errors in favor of more Type II errors.  In other 
words, the conventional standard is less tolerant of errors that would 
find a causal connection and more tolerant of errors that would fail to 
find one.  Examples 2 and 4, which suggest respectively that twenty-
nine exposed people have ailment Y (as opposed to twenty 
unexposed people), and that five exposed people have ailment Y (as 
opposed to two unexposed people), would not be accepted because 
the results do not satisfy the conventional standard of statistical 
 
than 1.65, and since the confidence interval does span 0, the result is not statistically 
significant (we do not reject the null hypothesis). 
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significance. 
It is important to note that the conventional standard does not 
mean that science usually accepts only results that are ninety-five 
percent certain.  Statistical significance at the level of p = .05 means 
that there is but one chance in twenty that the observed results could 
happen by chance.  Satisfying the standard means that there is one 
chance in twenty (or less) that mere accidental variation would 
produce such a result, not that we can be 95% certain that the 
outcome (twenty-two out of forty-two observed ailments were caused 
by exposure, or sixteen out of thirty-six, as Examples 1 and 3 
indicate) is correct.  We do not and cannot know that.  All we know is 
that the observed outcome would rarely be produced by chance 
alone, which gives us some reason to believe that the indicated 
correlation is correct.  Any suggestion, however, that the 
conventional standard produces results of which we are ninety-five 
percent certain is false.72 
Hence, it still needs to be said, it would make no sense to suggest 
that the civil justice system should accept results that are statistically 
significant at, say, the level p = .40 since such results leave us sixty 
percent certain of the conclusion, thus easily satisfying the notion of 
a preponderance of the evidence.  Suggestions of this sort are close 
akin to the “prosecutor’s fallacy,” to which courts and lawyers 
sometimes fall prey.  That fallacy equates the inverse of a scarcity 
factor with the probability of guilt: “The evidence shows that only 1 in 
1000 randomly-chosen people would have a DNA profile like the one 
found in the defendant’s blood and in the blood at the crime scene, 
so we must conclude that the probability is 99.9% that defendant is 
guilty.”  It is no more the case that p = .05 means that we can be 
ninety-five percent sure that the indicated correlation exists than it is 
the case that a scarce sample common to the defendant and the 
crime scene makes for near-certainty that defendant is guilty.  Of 
course it is possible to make a link between the one-in-twenty 
probability of reaching the observed outcome by chance and the 
probability of actual cause.  Likewise, it is possible to link the “1 in 
1000 randomly-chosen people” probability to the probability that 
defendant was at the crime scene.  Doing so, however, involves use of 
Bayes’ Theorem, which brings new complications and raises the 
 
 72 See David W. Barnes, Too Many Probabilities: Statistical Evidence of Tort Causation, 
64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 191, 208-09 (2001) (there is “no convenient way to 
translate the .05 p-value into a ninety-five percent confidence that the fact probability 
is correct,” in part because that value “assumes that the hypothesis is true” and “does 
not measure whether it is true”) [hereinafter Barnes, Too Many Probabilities]. 
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serious problem of assigning a prior probability to the point in issue.73 
Now the argument that Daubert is leading courts mistakenly to 
require of statistical outcomes the same level of significance that 
scientists normally require proceeds in this way: This strong scientific 
bias may be appropriate in the setting of science, but not in the 
setting of civil litigation.  Science observes this strong bias because 
science can afford it.  Science works incrementally and has “forever” 
to get it right.  Here is the way that one modern text in statistics 
explains the strong scientific bias: 
We want α to be small because Type I errors are expensive 
for the scientific (and the human) enterprise.  Suppose, for 
example, we . . . report in a journal that doses of vitamin B12 
increase IQ.  That will be an error that we made in good 
faith because we had no way of knowing that this particular 
result was a type I error . . . .  As a result, our readers will 
alter their behavior, perhaps focusing on a B12 diet while 
ignoring other avenues (such as reading enhancement 
programs) that might be effective in raising IQ.  Sometime 
later, perhaps, someone will conduct many experiments 
and find that vitamin B12 has no effect on IQ; that is, they 
will demonstrate that we had made a Type I error.  Our 
readers who believed our earlier report were done a 
possibly uncorrectable disservice because they may have 
ignored other avenues.  To prevent any further damage, we 
would want to find and contact the entire readership of our 
first report and inform them that our result was mistaken.  
That is clearly an expensive and difficult (if not impossible) 
thing to do. 
In contrast, the same text continues, we do not need as much 
protection from Type II errors (β-errors): 
Consider an investigator who conducts a single experiment 
to demonstrate that does of vitamin B12 increase IQ.  After 
 
 73 Bayes’ Theorem describes the degree to which an item of evidence, when 
expressed as a datum of known frequency, affects one’s prior estimate of the issue on 
which the evidence bears.  For accounts of Bayes’ Theorem, see David W. Barnes, Too 
Many Probabilities, at 208-09, and CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 
EVIDENCE § 7.18 (3d ed. 2003).  One problem in utilizing Bayes’ Theorem in this 
setting (indeed any setting) is that it is necessary to quantify the prior estimate of the 
probability before using the theorem to find the new probability, after taking into 
account the datum of known frequency.  If the prior estimate were .05 (very low 
probability of causation), then applying a statistical finding returned at the 
conventional level of statistical significance raises the odds to 1:1, meaning 
equilibrium, or a .5 probability that the degree of cause indicated by the finding (let 
us say 22 out of 42 instances) is true, or in other words even odds that 22 out of 42 
instances of ailment Y in the exposed population exposed were caused by agent X. 
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the data are collected, she concludes that the null 
hypothesis should not be rejected; that is, she concludes that 
vitamin B12 has no demonstrable effect on IQ.  As a 
consequence, the investigator will not report findings in a 
journal.  Instead, the investigation may be considered an 
exploration of a blind alley.  She had thought vitamin B12 
was effective, but apparently it wasn’t. 
 If subsequent research indicates that the conclusion of the 
original investigation was a Type II error, what is the 
expense of that error and who bears it?  One major expense 
is the time lost in the original investigation, but the bearer 
of that expense is the original investigator, not the scientific 
community at large.  There is no necessity of informing the 
community of a previous mistake because there was no 
report of findings in the first place . . . .74 
Now, the argument continues, our civil justice system differs 
from science in its goals and social purposes.  To start with, our civil 
justice system does not have unlimited time.  We cannot and do not 
defer decision in the interest of becoming more certain, and 
correlatively we hold that a lawsuit must reach a conclusion now.  
Moreover, we must leave the results reached in a lawsuit in place 
forever.  Our legal system cannot be tentative about its conclusions.  
In a sense, our legal system views “getting it right” as less important 
than “getting it done.”  Equally important, our civil justice system is 
premised on the principle that mistakes in denying relief are as 
harmful as mistakes in allowing recovery (plaintiff loses when the 
evidence is equally balanced only because we need a rule to resolve 
this case).75  Thus our civil justice system is neutral as between “false 
positives” and “false negatives” (α-errors as opposed to β-errors, Type 
I as opposed to Type II errors).  For our civil justice system, failing to 
 
 74 HURLBURT, supra note 21, at 196 (acknowledging, however, that Type I and 
Type II errors can both be costly; citing the example of a Type I error in the form of a 
false report that a drug is effective against AIDS, the author recognizes that this error 
could have “cruel effects, such as raising false hopes or discontinuing the funding of 
some other research”; the author also acknowledges, however, that a Type II error in 
“failing to report a drug that is in fact effective” would “also have cruel results, 
depriving needy individuals of effective treatment,” concluding that there is “no 
statistical answer” to the question which kind of error is more costly; it is “a matter of 
complex human judgment”). 
 75 Obviously criminal cases are another matter.  There our law strongly favors 
acquittals over convictions if the evidence is in close balance, which is somewhat akin 
to the idea of preferring false negatives (such as not finding cause when in fact there 
is cause) over false positives (like finding cause where none exists).  Some would 
argue that the bias of science would be appropriate in discouraging the state’s use of 
thin scientific evidence and grotesquely inappropriate in discouraging the defense 
use of thin scientific evidence. 
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find a cause that exists is as bad as finding one that does not exist.  
Hence our civil justice system should not require the level of 
statistical significance required by science, with its heavy bias against 
false positives. 
These differences between law and science do indeed suggest 
that we should consider carefully the possibility of accepting results in 
lawsuits that scientists are not yet prepared to accept.  In this paper, I 
am not prepared to stake out a final position on this issue.  Frankly, 
I’m not sure what the right answer is.  However, I do want to address 
the question how this argument fits with Daubert, to talk briefly about 
who ought to resolve the argument, and to raise some cautionary 
points. 
First, I think the Daubert framework can accommodate the view 
that courts ought to accept scientific evidence that does not satisfy 
the conventional standard that scientists require.  Daubert recognizes 
that the enterprises of law and science differ, and adopts the view that 
judges must make their own decision, in context and with reference 
to the needs of the legal system, on admitting or excluding evidence 
proffered as science.  It is true, as some have pointed out in criticizing 
Daubert, that there is language suggesting that courts should be more 
careful of science than is the professional community that produces 
science.76  But given the more basic premise of Daubert that the law 
must judge science for its own purposes, I don’t think this language is 
a serious obstacle to arguments favoring the admissibility of careful 
studies showing, for instance, a causal connection between ailment Y 
and agent X even if the results do not satisfy the conventional 
significance standard. 
Second, in this symposium Professor Cohen suggests that a 
scientist who has evidence indicating, for example, some marginal 
correlation between agent X and ailment Y, should be able to testify 
even if she says the results do not satisfy the conventional standard.77  
In Professor Cohen’s formulation, the scientist is seen explaining to 
the jury that science would not accept the indicated conclusion but 
that the scientist herself might do so for purposes of resolving a 
question that could not wait.  This proposal merits consideration, but 
it also raises questions.  To begin with, and I think Professor Cohen 
 
 76 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97 (noting that scientific conclusions are “subject to 
perpetual revision,” and science advances through “broad and wide-ranging 
consideration of a multitude of hypotheses” that can “eventually” be thrown out if 
wrong, but “[c]onjectures that are probably wrong are of little use” to the law, that 
must reach a “quick, final, and binding” judgment”). 
 77 See Neil Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of Legal 
Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 943 (2003). 
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agrees here, Daubert requires judges to determine what level of 
certainty or confidence is high enough to merit consideration by a 
jury.  It is not up to an expert or a jury to decide whether or not to 
accept evidence that does not satisfy the significance standard.  More 
importantly, telling jurors they can base their verdict on evidence that 
science would not accept may not be the right thing to do, and it is 
certainly a strange message: In effect, it says that “you may conclude 
that defendant caused plaintiff’s cancer even when qualified experts 
think the case is unproved.”  It is even questionable whether a 
scientist would feel comfortable (or able to comply with the oath 
required of witnesses) if she testified that while she does not 
professionally accept the indicated conclusion, she might personally do 
for purposes of resolving a lawsuit. 
Third, how clear is it that differences between the agendas of 
science and law justify applying a much more lenient standard to 
science offered as proof in litigation?  It is true that in any one lawsuit 
there is but one chance to get it right, but it is certainly not true that 
society as a whole, operating through the legal system, has but one 
chance.  When apparent toxic agent X appears, the system provides 
many opportunities to resolve the question whether agent X causes 
ailment Y, and the common-law method of building step by step on 
experience actually bears some resemblance to the scientific method 
of moving incrementally and withholding judgment until proof 
comes that is persuasive.  On the other side of the ledger, it is not 
true that the decision in one case affects only that case.  Particularly 
with medicines and other substances believed to have toxic effect, 
every court judgment has ripple effects, encouraging or discouraging 
parallel suits and settlements, and sometimes having legal impacts on 
later judgments.78  Hence errors made in the judicial system, whether 
favoring claimants or defendants, can produce additional errors as 
lawyers, claimants, and defendants react to them. 
Perhaps equally importantly, it is not really the case that our 
legal system is “neutral” with respect to errors.  In single cases we may 
be “neutral” as between errors favoring claimants and errors favoring 
defendants, but we are not neutral in aggregate on such points.  It is in 
part because courts recognize the perils of being wrong in huge cases 
that we have a series of decisions in the federal system that cut back 
 
 78 For well-known reasons, new claimants are not collaterally estopped by 
judgments won by the same defendant against prior claimants, and usually new 
claimants cannot take advantage of collateral estoppel against a defendant stemming 
from defendant’s prior loss on similar claims.  But decisions admitting or excluding 
scientific proof, or holding it sufficient or insufficient, are likely to have stare decisis 
effects in later suits. 
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on the use of class suits to resolve mass tort cases.79  Even on the 
supposition that toxic exposure cases are litigated individually, 
wrongly finding for the plaintiff would have considerable collateral 
effect, in likely reactions by the defendant and resultant changes in 
the availability of products.  On the supposition that toxic exposure 
cases are litigated in aggregate fashion, these collateral effects are 
even clearer and more pronounced. 
Finally, I want to suggest that the apparent caution of science 
may not be quite what it seems.  The conventional standard, after all, 
is just numbers—just the product of analysis of the quantification of 
data.  Behind the numbers are more and real uncertainties—the ones 
that go with designing tests, selecting cohorts, trying to eliminate 
differences apart from the factor in issue that might account for 
observed differences.  Part of the reason science insists on impressive 
numbers may be the recognition that it is hard or impossible to 
eliminate confounding variables, and that even promising results 
might not be replicable.  To the extent such apprehensions underlie 
the insistence on high numbers, the conventions of science are not 
conservative.  And there is an additional factor to consider, which is 
that scientists (like the rest of us) want to be noticed, and have an 
incentive to maximize the importance of their findings, which 
suggests that the high conventional standard for statistical 
significance acts as a counterbalance against self-serving human 
motivations that are in play not only among lawyers and politicians, 
but among scientists too, and indeed the whole human species.80 
 
 79 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (disapproving 
settlement of asbestos claims, largely on the basis of concern over adequate 
representation); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (refusing to allow 
certification of nationwide settlement class in asbestos case, largely on basis of 
concerns over adequate representation and because remedies under consideration 
cannot be created judicially and require legislative consideration); In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to certify class in suit 
against maker of blood solids, largely because of reluctance to stake future of 
defendants on outcome of single trial). 
 80 See, e.g., Lena Williams, Stalking the Elusive Healthy Diet; In Scientific Studies, 
Seeking the Truth in a Vast Gray Area, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1995, at C1 (Harvard 
epidemiologist comments that epidemiology is “a crude and inexact science,” and 
that “[e]ighty percent of cases are almost all hypotheses,” and that epidemiologists 
“tend to overstate findings, either because we want attention or more grant money”).  
See also Robert L. Park, The Seven Warning Signs of Bogus Science, 49 CHRON. OF HIGHER 
EDUC. 21, Jan. 31, 2003, at B20 (as “warning signs,” listing the fact that the scientist 
“pitches the claim directly to the media,” that she says “a powerful establishment is 
trying to suppress” her work, that the effect is “at the very limit of detection,” listing 
“anecdotal” evidence, stressing that the belief has “endured for centuries,” that the 
discoverer has “worked in isolation,” and that “new laws of nature” are required to 
understand the discovery). 
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IV.  DAUBERT CAN BE IMPROVED: APPELLATE REVIEW MADE REAL 
This paper defends the Daubert approach, but one troubling 
aspect of Daubert can and should be fixed.  That is the misplaced 
emphasis on the discretion of trial judges, which appears particularly 
in the Court’s two follow-up decisions in the Daubert line.  Indeed, it is 
at least possible to speculate that the sequence in which Daubert, 
Joiner, and Kumho Tire were decided has much to do with the growth 
in the emphasis on discretion.  The idea is hardly mentioned in 
Daubert itself, but it gained prominence in Joiner partly because the 
Ninth Circuit had adopted an implausible rule that trial judges have 
less discretion to exclude than to admit evidence proffered as science 
(the antidote was to hold that judges have discretion either way), and 
it made further gains in Kumho Tire because the project in that case 
entailed explaining how the standard for science could be applied 
usefully to experiential expertise (where a measure of discretion 
seems essential if the scheme is going to work at all).81 
I concur with commentators who say Daubert should be 
implemented by inviting appellate courts to take a close look at 
rulings by a trial court admitting or excluding evidence offered as 
science.82  Having become accustomed to the refrain among federal 
appellate courts that they accord deference to trial court decisions 
applying Daubert, I was surprised to learn that nine states and the 
District of Columbia instruct appellate courts to review rulings 
admitting or excluding evidence presented as science by applying a de 
novo standard.83  Some decisions apply this rigorous standard only to 
 
 81 In describing the gatekeeping function in Daubert, it is singular that the Court 
made no reference to discretion.  By my count, the Court mentioned discretion ten 
times in describing this function in Joiner (making many additional passing 
references to the term), and six times in the same context in Kumho Tire.  See Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 594 (mentioning that its standards are “flexible”); General Elec. Co. v. 
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-47 (1997) (repeatedly stressing discretion); Kumho Tire, 526 
U.S. at 151 (repeatedly stressing discretion, and pointedly saying that judge “must 
have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert’s reliability” that it 
has “when it decides whether or not that expert’s relevant testimony is reliable”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 82 See David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert and 
Joiner, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1997) (for ordinary decisions to admit evidence, where 
preliminary facts “depend on the testimony of witnesses,” appellate deference is 
warranted, but scientific evidence is “quite different,” and the trial judge is not in a 
“preferred position” in evaluating it).  See also Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing 
Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1047, 1065 (2003) (appellate courts 
should play more of a role in reviewing Daubert issues than Joiner suggests). 
 83 I looked at modern decisions from all fifty states, most of which endorse an 
abuse-of-discretion standard.  But a de novo standard has been adopted in Arizona, 
Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Oklahoma, and 
Washington, as well as the District of Columbia.  See generally Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 
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the basic question whether the theory and method are valid—or in 
Frye terms, to the proxy question whether they are generally 
accepted—and leave related questions like “helpfulness” under FRE 
702 for the trial judge to decide under an abuse-of-discretion 
standard. 
There are four reasons for preferring a more exacting standard 
in review. 
First, issues relating to the validity of theories and techniques 
transcend the facts of individual cases.  This observation applies, for 
example, to the question whether DNA profiling can reliably identify 
a blood or fluid sample as having very likely come from one person or 
another (the validity of the theory), to the question whether 
particular methods of analysis (such as RFLP, PCR, and STR) 
accurately measure the attributes of blood or fluid, and whether a 
particular laboratory protocol adequately guards against missteps and 
laboratory error.84  It applies to the question whether proffered 
 
N.W.2d 800, 814-15 (Minn. 2000) (whether proffered expertise satisfies state’s Frye-
Mack “general acceptance” standard “is a question of law that we review de novo,” but 
questions of “foundational reliability” are reviewed under “abuse of discretion” 
standard, as are matters of witness qualification); Kuhn v. Sandos Pharm. Corp., 14 
P.3d 1170, 1179 (Kan. 2000) (adopting de novo standard of review for proof of 
medical causation); Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 14 P.3d 596 (Or. 2000) 
(rejecting argument that appellate court should accord deference to trial court’s 
decision on scientific validity, and concluding that the issue is reviewed as for “errors 
of law”); Hadden v. State, 690 S.2d 573, 578 (Fla. 1997) (review of Frye issues is de 
novo); State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 619 (N.J. 1995) (in applying Frye standard, 
question whether scientific community generally accepts a method or test “can 
transcend a particular dispute,” and to the extent that Frye focuses on “issues other 
than a witness’s credibility or qualifications, deference to the trial court is less 
appropriate”); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 331 (Okla. 1995) (decision by trial court 
to admit novel scientific evidence should be subject to “an independent, thorough 
review,” and appellate court should “not simply ask whether an abuse of discretion 
was committed”); State v. Tankersley, 956 P.2d 486, 464 (Az. 1994) (rejecting Daubert 
and staying with Frye, and announcing that Frye issues are subject to de novo review); 
Schultz v. States, 664 A.2d 60, 64 (Md. App. 1994) (question of reliability of scientific 
technique “does not vary according to the circumstances of each case,” so it is 
inappropriate to apply abuse of discretion standard on review); State v. Cauthron, 
846 P.2d 502, 505 (Wash. 1993) (stating that court would “review the trial court’s 
decision to admit or exclude novel scientific evidence de novo”); United States v. 
Porter, 618 A.3d 629, 634 (D.C.  1992) (questions of general acceptance of new 
scientific techniques invite court “to establish the law of the jurisdiction for future 
cases,” so court would “engage in a broad review”). 
 84 The initials cited above refer to three of the more common methods for 
conducting DNA profiling.  RFLP refers to “restriction fragment length 
polymorphism,” and it is the first broadly useful approach that made its way into 
courtroom use.  PCR refers to “polymerase chain reaction,” a later development that 
allowed small samples to be “extended” so that the inevitable consumption of such 
materials in laboratory testing did not destroy the whole sample.  The drawback of 
PCR was that it could only extend some of the attributes of the original sample, so 
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statistical proof should satisfy the standard that scientists would 
require, to the question whether differential diagnosis can or cannot, 
standing alone, prove specific cause, to the question whether animal 
studies of any particular drug or chemical can prove causation in the 
human population, and to the question whether similarities between 
the chemical structures of a particular drug or other substance, on 
the one hand, and some other agent known to cause certain 
consequences, such as disease, on the other hand, can prove 
causation.  Questions of this magnitude need steadier guidance than 
the abuse-of-discretion standard provides, and the answers that courts 
reach should be applied in similar cases, rather than left to vary with 
the differing views of trial judges exercising discretion. 
Second, appellate courts are better situated than trial courts to 
resolve such questions.  To start with, three or more minds are likely 
to do better than one in appraising such technical issues.  And 
appellate review goes forward in a setting less subject to severe 
schedule pressures.  Furthermore, Daubert issues are likely to benefit 
from thorough appellate briefings.  And appellate review can involve 
consultation with technical materials and expert advice by means of 
amicus briefs or affidavits, or even live testimony.  Reviewing courts 
can even take judicial notice of technical books, articles, and other 
materials.85  Some sense of proportion is clearly warranted: It is one 
thing to supplement the arguments and briefs of counsel with 
references to additional material, and another thing to decide the 
case on grounds never considered by the lawyers who briefed the case 
without giving them any opportunity for input. 
Third, the Daubert standard needs elaboration in the variety of 
settings in which it is to apply, and trial judges need help and 
guidance beyond that provided by the standards themselves.  The 
problem of causation in toxic tort cases is a prime area in which 
appellate courts could play useful roles, and in which trial courts 
clearly want and need guidance. 
There is of course one countervailing concern, and that is that 
 
testing could not be as extensive.  STR, or “short tandem repeats,” is a still more 
recent development.  See generally Shreck, 22 P.3d at 73 (describing these techniques). 
 85 FRE 201 governs only judicial notice of “adjudicative” facts, and most technical 
material that might be noticed in this setting involves “evaluative” facts utilized by 
courts in their attempts to formulate wise rules of law.  The fact that FRE 201 does 
not cover evaluative facts does not mean they cannot be noticed.  Instead, the 
omission from coverage simply means that judicial notice of evaluative facts is not 
regulated by any formal rule.  See State v. Jones, 922 P.2d 806, 809 (Wash. 1996) (de 
novo review includes “sources outside the record such as scientific literature, law 
articles, and the decisions of other jurisdictions”) (applying state’s Frye standard). 
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the Daubert standard is both wide-ranging and case-specific.  It is wide-
ranging now, if it was not when Daubert was decided, because 
amended FRE 702 indicates that judges are to consider “principles 
and methods” and the sufficiency of underlying “facts or data,” and 
also the question whether the expert “has applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts,” and Kumho Tire makes it clear that the 
focus is the “task at hand,” as Professors Denbeaux and Risinger 
remind us.86  To the extent that the admissibility decision actually 
focuses, for example, on the question whether a particular laboratory 
protocol was or was not followed in the case at hand, or on the 
question whether a particular lapse or discrepancy in the data 
materially affected the outcome, some degree of deference to the 
decision of the trial judge is in order.  It is with larger questions, 
including those of theory and technique, and the appropriateness of 
the technique to the issue being decided, that closer scrutiny is 
warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision in Daubert changed the relationship 
between law and science.  Critics have argued that judges cannot act 
constructively in the way that Daubert envisions, but there are good 
reasons to think that indeed judges can rise to the task.  Critics have 
argued as well that Daubert has led to the exclusion of too much 
scientific evidence, particularly in toxic tort cases, and have adopted 
restrictive rules that are out of place and, in the federal system, 
infringe on the Erie doctrine.  But Daubert does not require adoption 
of such rules, and the cases show that courts are in fact working hard 
in very challenging areas to achieve appropriate outcomes in 
appraising science.  The Erie doctrine is not offended by federal 
efforts to implement a sufficiency standard. 
Critics have also argued that Daubert misconceives science, and 
the relationship between law and science.  But the dualism visible in 
Daubert’s account of science is also visible in the accounts of 
philosophers and historians of science, and the task is to reconcile 
notions of objectivity and subjectivity in scientific undertakings.  The 
truly difficult question whether scientific evidence proffered in civil 
 
 86 See amended FRE 702 (described in the text accompanying note 51, supra); see 
also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 154 (stressing that the question for the court is not “the 
reasonableness in general” of a particular technique, but “the reasonableness of using 
such an approach . . . to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the 
expert testimony was directly relevant”) (emphasis in original); Mark P. Denbeaux & 
Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the 
Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV __ (upcoming in Fall 2003). 
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cases should achieve a level of certainty that scientists themselves 
would require has not yet been resolved, but Daubert leaves room 
either to require that level or to admit scientific evidence on a lesser 
showing of significance.  Which choice should be made here remains 
open to debate. 
In the federal system, reviewing courts speak highly of the 
discretion that trial judges have in applying the Daubert standards, but 
a handful of states follow a different approach in allowing reviewing 
courts to appraise claims of error in applying Daubert on a de novo 
basis.  These courts are doing the right thing, as trial judges need 
more extensive appellate guidance in handling science in civil cases 
under the Daubert standard. 
